We conduct a real-effort experiment to test the effects of an affirmative action policy that reserves a share of the prize to subjects of a disadvantaged category in rent-seeking contests. We test three potential critiques to affirmative action policies in our setting: (i) whether the introduction of the policy reduces overall effort or distorts selection in the contest, (ii) whether it leads to reverse discrimination and (iii) whether the possibility of ex-post retaliatory actions undermines the effectiveness of the policy. We find that the affirmative action contest increases entry of players from the disadvantaged category without affecting entry of advantaged players. Moreover, the introduction of the policy does not negatively affect performance. However, we find that the possibility of retaliation can undermine the benefits of the affirmative action policy reducing contest participation. This suggests that retaliation is an important aspect to consider when implementing affirmative action policies.
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Introduction
Affirmative action policies are adopted in markets structured as contests or tournaments in the form of quotas or leg up for members of disadvantaged groups (Holzer and Neumark (2000) ). Despite their wide use they have been criticized for several reasons. Some advocate that these types of policies reduce overall effort and distort selection attracting only less productive individuals. Another common critique is that these policies lead to reverse discrimination, i.e., reduce opportunities and participation of nontargeted categories. Finally, an additional concern is the possibility that, if the policies are perceived as unfair, they may generate frictions between targeted and non-targeted individuals (see, e.g., Shteynberg et al. (2011) ). This could lead to retaliation towards the protected category as a consequence of their preferential treatment under the policy. In a workplace environment, retaliation can take various forms of conflict between employees such as, for example, bullying (Einarsen (1999) , Samnani and Singh (2012) ).
To the best of our knowledge, retaliation as a reaction to affirmative action has not received much attention in the literature. However, it is often considered and regulated by governments, as for example the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), whereby retaliation is defined as "the adverse action against someone filing a complaint regarding discrimination in the workplace" and as an act of "revenge where a person perceives unfair treatment and attempts to restore equilibrium by taking the matter into his or her own hands". According to their figures, retaliation has been the most frequently alleged basis of discrimination in the federal sector from fiscal years 2008 to 2013 and it constitutes a major threat to the effectiveness of affirmative action policies (see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation_considerations.cfm). 1 The aim of this paper is to test experimentally whether affirmative action is immune from the three critiques listed above. We study an affirmative action policy of the type introduced and studied theoretically by Dahm and Esteve (2014) , that is, the creation of an extra prize for a disadvantaged category in the Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking. The model is used to describe a variety of reallife settings, such as job-seeking or sports competitions (see Konrad (2009)) , where players exert effort in trying to get ahead of their rivals and prizes are assigned in a probabilistic way, proportional to participants' effort. For a given level of effort, players' probability of being successful may be heterogeneous across subjects because of differences in individual productivity. Due to this heterogeneity, inefficiencies may arise as less productive individuals could decrease their effort to 1 They claim that "If retaliation for such activities were permitted, it would have a chilling effect upon the willingness of individuals to speak out against employment discrimination or to participate in the EEOC's administrative process or other employment discrimination proceedings." Many affirmative action policies, adopting this legal framework, explicitly forbid retaliation (see, for example, http://www.psu.edu/dept/aaoffice/retaliation.htm). Anecdotal evidence of retaliation in the workplace for denouncing pay inequality has been recently featured in an article of the Business Insider (see http://www.businessinsider.com/erica-baker-pay-inequality-at-google-2015-7?IR=T). maximize the expected payoff (Leininger (1993) ) or could abstain from actively participating in the contest (Stein (2002) ).
The policy we study aims at increasing the participation of the disadvantaged category avoiding the efficiency deterioration effects mentioned above. This is obtained by transforming a contest with one prize into a contest with two prizes of unequal size, where competition for the bigger prize is open to all participants while the smaller prize is reserved only to participants with the low level of productivity (disadvantaged category). Given that the two prizes in the latter contest are derived splitting the prize in the former, the policy comes at no cost for the contest organizer.
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Previous laboratory experiments proved to be a powerful tool to understand the beneficial role of affirmative action policies (see, e.g., Schotter and Weigelt (1992) , Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) and Niederle et al. (2013) ). Our paper extends the literature in several important ways. First, we provide the first experimental investigation of affirmative action through extra prizes. Second, we are the first to our knowledge to test retaliation as an obstacle to the effectiveness of affirmative action policies.
Finally, we study a setting where there is heterogeneity in subjects' productivity, while most of the recent contributions study affirmative action in the context of gender differences in tournament participation where there are typically no differences in productivity between men and women. In this aspect, our study is similar to Calsamiglia et al. (2013) who study the effects of giving an advantage to less productive subjects in the competition in a field experiment. However, it differs from it in many other aspects: first, the subject pool is composed by primary school kids while ours is a typical university students' subject pool; second, they test different affirmative action policies compared to ours; finally, they do not assess the possibility of retaliation.
Our paper is also related to the experimental literature on the effects of contest structure on subjects' participation and effort (see Cason et al. (2010) and Dechenaux et al. (2014) for a review). One important difference between ours and most of the studies above is that we study the affirmative action in an environment with a probabilistic outcome such as the lottery contest. We envisage many real-life applications where the nature of the contest is probabilistic rather than deterministic (e.g. patent races, art or sport competitions, job settings where performance is not exactly measurable and hence stochastic components determine the assignment of performance bonuses).
In our experiment, we exogenously manipulate subjects' productivity to create two categories of players. We compare the efficiency and participation properties of a basic contest structure with just one prize against the modified affirmative action contest, i.e., two prizes. Furthermore, we test whether the possibility of retaliation can diminish the benefits of the affirmative action policy. Our experimental implementation of retaliation consists of the opportunity for all subjects to reduce the value of prizes at their own monetary cost after they exerted effort and before the contest winners are revealed. 3 We find that the affirmative action policy strongly increases participation of subjects from the disadvantaged category without discouraging the participation of advantaged subjects. This leads to an overall increase in effort in the contest. However, our results from the retaliation treatment indicate that, although the majority of subjects seldom retaliate, the mere possibility of prize reduction can have a substantial effect on participation of the disadvantaged subjects, decreasing the positive participation effects of the affirmative action policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we describe the experimental design and procedures; in section 3 we report the results of the experiment and in section 4 we summarize the results and conclude.
Experimental design and procedures
In this section, we first introduce the real effort task used in the experiment and highlight the differences with previous implementations; we then describe the structure of the experiment and the experimental treatments, and last we briefly describe our experimental procedures.
The real effort task
In our experiment, subjects are asked to perform a task under different incentive schemes. This real effort task is a modified version of the "slider task" (Gill and Prowse (2012) ). In the original implementation by Gill and Prowse (2012) , each subject faces one screen with a number of sliders positioned at 0 and they have to position the sliders at 50 using their mouse. Subjects receive a piecerate payment for each slider they position correctly at 50 and have a time limit to perform the task.
Importantly, the number of the sliders on the screen does not vary across experimental subjects or across repetitions of the task.
Our implementation modifies three aspects of the original task. First, we consider multiple screens with sliders and incentives are linked to the number of screens completed. Second, we exogenously manipulate the difficulty of the task by varying the number of sliders per screen across subjects. These two differences are necessary to create exogenous variation in productivity across subjects. In particular, half of the subjects in our experiment are advantaged (called "white players" in the experiment) as they had to position 4 sliders to complete one screen while the other half ("blue players") 4 are disadvantaged as they had to position 8 sliders per screen. Subjects knew about the heterogeneity from the beginning of the experiment.
Finally, we allow subjects to use both mouse and keyboard to position the sliders at 50. This last difference compared to the original implementation is needed to minimize heterogeneity in productivity "per slider" across subjects. We explain subjects in the instructions how to use the mouse by clicking twice on the slider and then arrows on the keyboard to adjust the slider at 50. This ensures substantial differences in productivity between advantaged and disadvantaged subjects but very low differences within each category.
Experimental design and treatments
Our design is based on the task described above and it consists of 5 parts.
4 Part 1 is a practice round; subjects are asked to perform our modified slider task for 5 minutes without monetary incentives. Only for this part all subjects have ten sliders per screen. Subjects are explicitly told to practice the slider task using both mouse and keyboard as described above. At the end of Part 1, we reveal to subjects whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged players. The assignment of the disadvantage is randomly determined and this is common knowledge.
In Part 2, subjects are asked to perform the real effort task for 5 minutes under piece-rate incentives.
Subjects receive 0.10€ per screen completed.
In Part 3, participants are randomly matched into groups of four composed by two advantaged and two disadvantaged players (common knowledge). In each group, subjects compete in a Tullock contest:
following the standard contest success function, the probability of a subject to win the prize(s) depends on the number of screens completed individually divided by the total number of screen completed by the group.
In Part 4, subjects choose between a piece-rate analogous to Part 2 and the contest as in Part 3. One difference with previous similar designs (with the exception of ) is that we allow subjects to select the contest in Part 4 and compete against the others who made the same choice rather than letting them compete against the performance of all other players in the group in Part 3 (see Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) ). Although this feature of our design adds strategic uncertainty, it is a crucial aspect in order to be able to test the effect of retaliation on contest entry. Specifically, we need a setting where the contest participation of an additional player reduces the probability of winning for the other players in the contest and potentially generates resentment that leads to retaliatory actions. This is cannot happen in the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) implementation where the probability of winning the contest is independent from sorting choices of other group members.
In Part 5, we elicit subjects' risk attitudes using both an incentivized choice list task and a survey measure. In the former, subjects choose between a lottery paying €0 or €4 with 50% probability and a certain amount. The certain amount increases along the table, from 0.75€ to 3.75€. Furthermore, we conducted a socio-demographic questionnaire where we also elicited risk aversion using a wellestablished survey measure validated in a representative subject pool (see ).
Subjects are asked to answer the following question on a Likert scale from 0 to 10: "How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?"
After performing under piece-rate incentives (Part 2, and possibly 4), subjects are informed only about their individual performance and earnings. After performing in the contests (Part 3, and possibly 4), subjects are also informed about the performance of each of the other contestants together with their probability of winning each prize. The winners of the contest prize(s) are revealed only at the end of the experiment. Subjects know the existence of several parts but do not know the details of subsequent parts while they are making their choices.
We run three between-subjects treatments using the design structure described above. The three treatments differ in the contest structures of Part 3 and 4: in the BASE treatment subjects compete for a contest prize of 10€; in the affirmative action treatment (AA) the prize is split between a big prize of 8€ and a small prize of 2€. All group members in Part 3 and all those who choose the contest in Part 4 compete to win the big prize, while only the disadvantaged participants can compete for the small prize.
In case none of the disadvantaged participants decides to enter the contest in Part 4, the main prize becomes 10€.
The third treatment, retaliation (RET), has the same contest structure of AA but it gives subjects participating in the contest the additional opportunity to reduce any of the prizes at their own expenses.
This opportunity is revealed to subjects in the instructions for Part 3 and 4. Hence, their effort and entry decisions can be affected by the expected prize reduction. Subjects know that they had received an additional €0.50 that they can keep or spend in the reduction of one or both prizes after their entry and effort decision. Notice that the additional 0.50€ are allocated independently of the choice between contest and piece-rate, thus leaving unaltered the ex-ante value of the two options compared to the AA treatment. In Part 3 every group member can reduce the prizes, while in Part 4 only the subjects who entered the contest can reduce the prizes. When subjects receive feedbacks on their and the other contestants' probabilities of winning, they also see two input boxes on their screens, one for each prize.
They need to enter a number in each input box and the maximal sum allowed is 0.50€. For each cent spent on the reduction, the targeted prize is reduced by 2 cents.
It is worth noticing that our exogenous productivity manipulation does not create any strong sense of entitlement or conflict between the two categories as the disadvantage is given randomly and we do not use any loaded framing avoiding the terms "advantage" and "disadvantage". Hence, any effect of 6 retaliation may be a lower bound compared to what we could observe in situations where the advantaged category feels strong entitlement for their advantage or stronger conflict between the two categories is present.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab in June 2015 using the software z-tree (Fischbacher (2007) ). Once seated, subjects were given instructions that introduced details of the experiment (see Appendix B) and were read aloud by the experimenter. Specific instructions for each part were computerized and shown to subjects on screens just before each part. The experimenter answered questions in private and no communication between participants was allowed. We conducted nine sessions in total, with either 16 or 20 subjects, each resulting in 172 subjects recruited from a wide range of disciplines through HRoot (Bock et al. (2014) ). No participant took part in more than one session. Participants did not know the identities of the other subjects with whom they were grouped. A session lasted on average 60 minutes and subjects earned on average 11.70€.
Results
We investigate the main results of the experiment analyzing Part 4, after subjects have experienced both the piece-rate and the contest and hence reveal their preferences for one of the two incentive schemes. We divide our results section in three subsections: in the first one we use data from Part 2 and Part 3 to check that our exogenous productivity manipulation was successful. In the second one, we analyze the determinants of contest participation in Part 4 and the differences in contest entry across treatments. The final subsection reports results on performance conditional on entry across treatments from Part 4.
Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 we report the descriptive statistics classified by treatment and type of player (advantaged or disadvantaged). For each category, we report the average number of sliders positioned correctly and the number of screens completed in Part 2. Furthermore, we report the average realized probabilities of winning the contest in Part 3 for the main prize (€10 in BASE and €8 in AA and RET). On average subjects position 91.51 sliders correctly, with a standard deviation of 15.38. The statistics indicate that we were successful in our modification of the slider task to create low heterogeneity in productivity "per slider" as shown by the average number of sliders positioned at 50, but substantial heterogeneity in productivity "per screen" between advantaged and disadvantaged as
shown by the number of screens completed. Moreover, the average number of slider positioned is not statistically different between advantaged and disadvantaged in any of the treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test, p ≥ 0.576) while the number of screens completed by advantaged and disadvantaged is significantly different in all treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test, all p < 0.001). The data from the contest in Part 3 show that the productivity manipulation holds also under a different incentive scheme.
Advantaged subjects are twice as much likely to win the main prize compared to disadvantaged subjects in all treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test, all p < 0.001). The low standard deviations within each category shows that these results are common across all groups in our experiment.
In the next two subsections, we analyze our main research questions, i.e., how the affirmative action policy and the possibility to retaliate affect contest entry and performance in Part 4.
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Contest entry
Result 1. Affirmative action increase participation of players from the disadvantaged category without
affecting entry of players from the advantaged category. Figure 1 shows the entry rate of advantaged and disadvantaged subjects across treatments. AA increases contest participation significantly compared to BASE (from 67% to 87%, χ 2 (1) = 6.70, p = 0.010). This effect is entirely driven by different entry levels of the disadvantaged players. While in BASE only 50% of the disadvantaged players choose the contest, their participation increases significantly up to 90% in AA (χ 2 (1) = 9.60, p = 0.008). Advantaged participants are not affected by the prize structure: in both BASE and AA exactly 83% of them choose the contest. Of the 15 groups in BASE, four have no disadvantaged players choosing the contest, in seven groups we observe entry of only one of the two disadvantaged players, while only in four groups both disadvantaged players choose the contest. In all the 15 groups in AA we observe entry of at least one disadvantaged player, with entry of both players in twelve of them.
Result 2. The threat of retaliation reduces participation of the disadvantaged category without affecting entry of the advantaged.
In RET the overall entry rate drops to 77% from 87% of AA. This reduction is not significant (χ 2 (1) = 1.80, p = 0.179). However, as shown in Figure 1 , this reduction is again entirely due to disadvantaged subjects. While entry for the advantaged subjects is unaffected by the possibility of retaliation, the entry rate of disadvantaged subjects decreases significantly to 69% compared to 90% in AA (χ 2 (1) = 5.04, p = 0.025). Interestingly, this level of participation from the disadvantaged category is not significantly different from the entry rate in BASE (χ 2 (1) = 4.06, p = 0.132).
Figure 1. Proportion of subjects choosing contest in Part 4
Results 1 and 2 are supported by parametric estimates in Table 2 , where we report probit regressions estimating the determinants of entry decisions. Model (1) estimates only the effect of the treatments on the choice between contest and piece-rate. The dependent variable, "Entry choice", takes value 1 if a subject choose to participate in the contest and 0 otherwise. We regress this variable on a dummy for the type of player (Disadvantage), treatment dummies (AA and RET) with BASE as omitted category and the interaction terms between the treatment dummies and the type variable. For ease of interpretation, we report marginal effects instead of coefficients. Model (1) shows that being a disadvantaged player reduces the likelihood of participating in the contest by almost 28%. Moreover, it
shows that the treatments (AA and RET) have virtually no effect on participation choices of advantaged players, while this is not the case for disadvantaged players. In particular, the two interaction terms reveal that being in the treatment AA raises significantly the probability that a disadvantaged player chooses contest by 25%, while it does in RET by 11%. The estimated coefficient for Disadvantage × RET is, however, not significant revealing that the affirmative action policy tends to be less effective when retaliation is possible. In Model (2), we control for subjects' ability in the task including the number of sliders correctly positioned in Part 2 of the experiment. 6 As expected, the coefficient is very small indicating that the impact of differences in ability on the likelihood of entering the contest is rather small as expected given our implementation of the slider task. Despite the coefficient being small, this variable is a significant predictor for choosing contest in Part 4. Finally and most importantly, the coefficient of the interaction Disadvantage × AA remains significant indicating a robust effect of the affirmative action policy in promoting entry by disadvantaged players.
In Model (3) we include other controls that might affect the decision between contest and piece-rate.
In particular, we add the survey measure for risk attitudes and the dummy Female. This model reveals that risk attitudes have a significant impact on the choice between contest and piece-rate. In particular, an increase by one point on the ten points scale measuring willingness to take risks increases the probability of choosing contest by 6%. Again, adding these controls does not change the significance of the interaction Disadvantage × AA.
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We do not find significant gender differences in our data. Women enter the competition as much as men do. This result contrasts the previous literature in tournaments with real-effort tasks, where women tend to shy away from competition. We speculate that the difference with the existing literature may be due to the different nature of the task. 6 We decided to use number of sliders rather than number of screens as a performance measure because it is a finer measure of subjects' effort in the experiment. Using the number of screens does not change our main results. Additional estimates using the number of screens instead of the number of sliders are reported in Appendix A. 7 We conducted also an alternative to Model (3) including the incentivized measure of risk aversion instead of the questionnaire one. Interestingly, this measure of risk aversion is significant only at 5% compared to 1% of the questionnaire measure, worsening the overall fit of the model as indicated by a Pseudo R 2 of 0.211. Hence, we decided to use the questionnaire measure for the remainder of the paper. Additional estimates including the incentivized measure are available upon request. Notes: the table reports marginal effects and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
To sum up, the results show that the introduction of the affirmative action policy fills the entry gap due to productivity differences between advantaged and disadvantaged players completely. However, the possibility of retaliation constitutes a strong enough threat for disadvantaged players to reduce their willingness to participate up to a level not significantly different from BASE. The next question we ask is whether retaliation truly constitutes a threat, i.e., whether subjects spend resources to reduce the contest prizes.
Result 3. The lower entry by disadvantaged subjects is not justified by a reduction in earnings given
the realized retaliation. 9 We also estimate linear models with multilevel random effects at group and type level; results are in line to the ones reported in Table 2 . Moreover, in all four models the LR test fails to reject the hypothesis of no difference with linear regression estimations (see Appendix A). For this reason, we opted for the probit models reported in Table 2 . Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the average amount of prize reduction and the percentage of resources spent in prize reduction activity. As is clear from the percentages, subjects rarely engage in prize reduction. Only 5 subjects (10% of our sample) engage in prize reduction. The reductions are not significantly different from zero for the 2€ prize and are significantly different from zero at 10% level for the 8€ prize (t-test p = 0.324 and p = 0.078 respectively). Advantaged players seem to reduce both prizes. This is surprising since reducing the €8 prize directly affects their earnings. Regarding disadvantaged players, we find that no one uses the possibility to reduce the 2€ prize, but they use the opportunity to reduce the €8 prize significantly more (two-tailed signrank test, p = 0.084). 10 This is what subjects could expect given feedbacks from Part 3. Given we do not elicit beliefs about other group members' entry, we construct subjects' expectation assuming full entry. Considering that in RET, we predicted and found lower entry than in AA, the results can be considered as a conservative estimate of the expected payoff difference between RET and AA. 11 Notice that the lower entry is also not justified by unattractiveness of the contest compared to the piece-rate. If we subtract the piece-rate earnings from Part 2 to the contest expected earnings, we find that advantaged subjects would earn on average 0.45€ and 0.33€ more in the contest than in the piece-rate in AA and RET, respectively. These differences are even stronger for disadvantaged subjects, who would earn 1.17€ and 1.25€ more in the contest than in the piece-rate. To sum up, the observed retaliation does not significantly change expected payoffs from AA to RET.
Hence, the lower entry by disadvantaged players is not justified in terms of expected earnings reduction.
We conjecture that disadvantaged players hold incorrect beliefs about the likelihood and prevalence of retaliation.
Performance conditional on entry
In this subsection we analyze performance conditional on choosing contest. In particular, we analyze whether the introduction of the affirmative action policy in AA and the possibility to retaliate in RET has detrimental effects on total and individual effort.
To investigate total effort we compute the total number of sliders correctly positioned for the subjects who choose contest in Part 4 for each group and compare total performance at the group level across treatments.
Result 4a. The affirmative action policy increases total effort significantly compared to our baseline treatment.
12 For graphical purposes we excluded one outlier from the figure, i.e., an advantaged subject in RET that did not exert any effort in Part 3. Averages and statistical tests reported above the figure include this subject. This analysis neglects that the total effect is a combination of the extensive and intensive margin, i.e., the higher overall effort in AA can be caused by the fact that more subjects choose the contest in AA and also by any modification in individual effort due to the different contest structures. In what follows, we disentangle these two effects looking at individual effort. To investigate this, we run additional OLS regressions, separately for advantaged and disadvantaged subjects. Our dependent variable is the number of screens completed in the contest in Part 4. Our explanatory variables are treatment dummies (AA and RET) with BASE as the omitted category, the measure of individual ability from Part 2 (number of sliders positioned correctly), the interaction terms between treatment dummies and performance, and controls for risk attitudes and gender.
Result 4b. Neither the affirmative action policy nor the possibility to retaliate significantly affect the performance of subjects selecting contest.
Estimates of the models described above are reported in Table 4 . The estimates show that, although the coefficients associated with the interaction terms are negative, they are far from being significantly different from zero. This indicates that neither the affirmative action policy nor the possibility to retaliate affect the performance of advantaged and disadvantaged subjects. This result is consistent with results reported in Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) and Niederle et al. (2013) indicating that affirmative action policies do not discourage effort by participants. Notes: OLS coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have explored experimentally the effects of an affirmative action policy in Tullock contest settings. We find that the introduction of an extra prize reserved to disadvantaged subjects strongly encourages their participation without harming efficiency and discouraging advantaged subjects from participation. This affirmative action policy proves to be immune to criticisms related to efficiency-loss and our results show that the policy does not generate reverse discrimination, that is, negative effects on the advantaged subjects.
We have also shown how the threat of retaliation may challenge the beneficial effects of the affirmative action policy. These results are found in a setting where heterogeneity among players is implemented exogenously through a random draw. Hence, the sense of entitlement of the advantage may be weak and our results can be seen as a lower bound of the detrimental effects of retaliation on contest participation. 13 An important avenue for future research is to investigate whether these negative effects are amplified when subjects feel a stronger sense of entitlement of their role as for example if they earn the advantage through a competition.
Given our results from the retaliation treatment, we believe that, to fully exploit the participation benefits of the policy, it is important to protect subjects under affirmative action from possible retaliatory behavior. We think that retaliation, and the various forms it may take under different settings, is an important factor to take into account when analyzing the implementation of new affirmative action policies. Research suggests, for example, that some organizational structures, that do not foster a procedurally fair environment, may encourage retaliation (see Samnani and Singh (2012) ). We acknowledge that more research is needed to understand whether and how our findings on retaliation extend to other affirmative action settings and different organizational structures.
Appendix A Notes: the table reports estimated coefficients from linear mixed effects models using random intercepts at the group and type level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. (1)) and a linear mixed effects models using random intercepts at the group and type level (Model (2)). In Model (1) we report marginal effects and robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
